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If workers can choose between permanent and flexible contracts, compensating wage 
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Estimating  job  satisfaction  using  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey  shows  that 
agency  and  casual  contracts  are  associated  with  routinely  lower  satisfaction.  This 
results because the low job satisfaction associated with less job security is not offset 
by  higher  compensation  or  other  job  characteristics.    Job  security  is  sufficiently 
important that holding constant this one facet of satisfaction eliminates the overall gap 
in job satisfaction between flexible and permanent contracts.   
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This  paper  estimates  the  influence  of  flexible  --  more  contingent  --  employment 
contracts on the job satisfaction of British workers.  Flexible employment contracts 
have become increasingly prevalent among OECD countries (Mangan 2000).
1  This 
increasing  prevalence  reflects  changes  in  labour  market  regulation,  technological 
change and increasing female labour force participation. While some observers may 
characterize flexible contracts as wholly beneficial or detrimental for employees, a 
balanced reading presents  mixed  consequences.  For  instance,  flexible employment 
contracts  are  associated  with  lower  levels  of  employer  provided  training 
(Arulampalam  and  Booth,  1998,  Draca  and  Green,  2004),  higher  risk  of  social 
exclusion for men (Addio and Rosholm, 2005), lower wages in the UK (Booth et al, 
2002) and increased job insecurity (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). At the same time, 
flexible  employment  contracts  are  associated  with  higher  rates  of  entry  into 
permanent employment (when compared to unemployed job search) both in general 
(Guell and Petrongolo, 2001), and via promotion within the firm (Green and Leeves, 
2004).  In  addition,  increased  employment  flexibility  may  lead  to  overall  higher 
employment and participation rates (Lazear, 1990) and this may reflect the appeal of 
more contingent employment to workers who desire flexible schedules (Morris and 
Vekker 2001). 
 
We  examine  job  satisfaction  to  summarize  these  potentially  conflicting  outcomes. 
Hamermesh  (2004)  emphasizes  that  economists  studying  job  satisfaction  should 
attempt to test theoretical predictions about worker behaviour and/or labour market 
                                                 
1 In the UK, the growth in flexible contracts has been concentrated in the rise of agency work (Forde 
and Slater 2005).   3 
functioning.  In  taking  this  call  seriously,  we  note  that  at  its  best  job  satisfaction 
approaches a measure of on-the-job utility. As Hamermesh (2001, p. 2) puts it, job 
satisfaction is the only measure "that might be viewed as reflecting how (workers) 
react to the entire panoply of job characteristics" and as such "it can be viewed as a 
single metric that allows the worker to compare the current job to other labour market 
opportunities."  Thus job satisfaction measures allow a summary worker evaluation of 
the consequences of flexible employment contracts. 
2  
 
Despite this strong appeal, there have been relatively few previous examinations by 
economists.  Those  that  do  exist  suggest  that  flexible  employment  contracts  are 
associated  with  dramatically  lower  levels  of  job  satisfaction.
3  Yet,  because  these 
studies do not focus primarily on the relationship between flexible contracts and job 
satisfaction, there remains substantial scope for further study. First, flexible working 
contracts cover a variety of employment contracts, such as seasonal work, fixed term 
contracts, agency temping and casual employment. Existing evidence by economists 
on  job  satisfaction  has  aggregated,  and  so  eliminated,  these  differences.  Second, 
workers are likely to sort, and be sorted, across employment contract types. Existing 
research has not controlled for unobservable differences between workers on flexible 
and  permanent  employment  contracts.  Third,  the  separate  dimensions  of  job 
satisfaction  have  not  been  explored  to  determine  which  characteristics  of  flexible 
contract jobs reduce satisfaction.  It may be that the work is less interesting itself, or 
that it pays poorly or that there is little job security or that it involves too few or too 
many hours.  It may be some combination of these.   
                                                 
2 Satisfaction with the job has also been seen as one of the major "domains" that together with 
satisfaction with leisure, health and others aggregate to an overall measure of subjective well-being 
(van Pragg et al. 2003). 
3 See for instance Booth et al (2002) and estimates of temporary contracts effect on job satisfaction 
reported in Clark and Oswald (1996).   4 
 
This  paper  provides  detailed  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  a  variety  of 
disaggregated flexible employment contracts and job satisfaction. This is provided 
across a range of dimensions of  job  satisfaction:  job security, pay,  hours and the 
nature of the work itself. Moreover, by estimating a fixed effects ordered probit on 
our  panel,  we  provide  the  first  estimates  of  flexible  work’s  influence  on  job 
satisfaction that are robust to sorting across employment contracts.  
 
In what follows, the next section assumes flexible and traditional contracts are offered 
in  the  same  labor  market  as  a  device  to  make  predictions  about  the  relationship 
between flexible contracts and job satisfaction.  The third section presents our data 
and testing methodology.  The fourth section presents the initial results followed by 
more detail and further estimates in the fifth section.  The sixth section concludes. 
 
2. FLEXIBILITY AND JOB SATISFACTION 
The  basic  economics  of  flexibility  focuses  on  the  coordination  of  worker  effort. 
Deardorff  and  Stafford  (1976)  make  clear  that  both  firms  and  workers  have 
preferences over the direction of this effort.  The firm prefers that workers be flexible 
allowing it to coordinate effort across workers in the cheapest fashion (for example 
having all workers show up for the same scheduled shift with on call workers to fill 
absences).  On the other hand, workers prefer that the firm be flexible allowing them 
to work when it best fits their schedules (yields the most utility).  Indeed, the term 
flexibility  has  actually  been  used  to  characterize  both  of  these  extremes  in  the 
contract.  Thus, when the firm is being flexible it is often identified as providing a 
family friendly work practice such as "flextime" (Heywood et al. 2007). Yet, when   5 
the  worker  is  being  flexible  as  happens  with  short  intensive  hires  or  on  call  and 
agency relationships it is identified as a "flexible staffing arrangement" (Gramm and 
Schell 2001; Houseman 2001). The probability that the firm's cost minimizing work 
arrangement  and  the  workers'  utility  maximizing  work  arrangement  coincide  is 
essentially zero.
4  Thus, competition in product and labor markets should generate a 
wage that is higher if the agreed upon arrangement more closely mirrors that desired 
by the firm and that is lower if the agreed upon arrangement more closely mirrors that 
desired by the workers.  
 
Given the natural heterogeneity in the cost for firms to provide flexibility to workers, 
a  hedonic  equilibrium  should  develop  in  which  employers  with  higher  costs  in 
providing  workers  flexibility  retain  flexibility  for  themselves  (flexible  staffing 
arrangements) and pay higher wages (Duncan and Stafford 1980).  Those employers 
with  lower  costs  give  up  their  flexible  staffing  arrangements,  provide  staffing 
arrangements  more  beneficial  to  workers  and  pay  lower  wages.    Thus,  economic 
theory predicts that compensating earnings differences should emerge that offset the 
disadvantage of a flexible staffing contracts such as seasonal work, having a fixed 
term or doing agency work. 
 
This prediction receives support from a variety of empirical studies.  Both Moretti 
(2000)  and  Del  Bono  and  Weber  (2008)  show  that otherwise  equal  workers  earn 
significantly  higher  wages  when  working  on  seasonal  jobs  compared  to  similar 
permanent  jobs.  De  Graaf-Zijl  (2005)  confirms  a  positive  compensating  wage 
differential for on-call workers in the Netherlands. Such findings fit with the detailed 
                                                 
4 This results from the differences in the distribution of desires across firms and workers and by search 
costs that make sorting imperfect.  See Duncan and Stafford (1980) for more detail.   6 
examination  of  worker  valuations  confirming  a  marginal  willingness  to  pay  for  a 
reduced risk of unemployment (Van Ommeren and Hazans 2007). They also fit with 
evidence from the provision of family friendly work practices. Using US data from 
the state of New York, Baughman et al. (2003) show that employers unable to provide 
scheduling  freedom  to  employees  pay  significantly  higher  entry  wages.    Using 
representative UK data, Heywood et al. (2007) demonstrate the existence of sizable 
negative wage differentials both for more generous leave policies and for providing 
employees choice over  working  hours.  Thus,  when the  firm retains  flexibility  in 
assigning work effort, wages are higher, and when workers gain favourable flexible 
arrangements wages are lower. 
 
Yet,  the  fundamental  concern  that  workers  may  face  with  flexible  staffing 
arrangements is that the firm's flexibility includes greater termination rights.  In short, 
workers enjoy far less job security and it is known that workers value job security all 
else equal (Theodossiou and Vasileio 2007).  However, the basic insight made by 
Deardorff and Stafford (1976) remains.  If the firm retains the flexibility to terminate 
more easily, the earnings required to encourage a worker into such an arrangement 
must be greater.  This receives empirical support from Li (1986) and Heywood (1989) 
who  each  show  that  in  representative  US  samples  higher  unemployment  risk  is 
compensated for with higher earnings. 
 
The point of reviewing empirical evidence is not to suggest that these relationships 
are taken for granted.  Instead, they indicate only that there exists some support for 
the prediction from theory that flexibility over worker effort is something that both 
firms and workers value and that it is reasonable to think about a hedonic market in   7 
which this flexibility is exchanged in the labor market for an implicit price.    Thus, 
our initial suggestion  from theory  is that  job satisfaction should  not differ greatly 
between otherwise equal workers in traditional and in "flexible staffing" contracts.  
While workers may not like such contracts, they should be compensated either by 
earnings or other work dimensions for taking them. 
 
Having  drawn  this  suggestion  we  are  quick  to emphasize  that  it  follows  from  an 
assumption of active competition between workers and firms across different types of 
contracts.  If workers in  flexible staffing contracts are not able to find alternative 
contracts and are somehow crowded into a limited labour market that consists of only 
flexible contracts, this suggestion is unlikely to hold.  Instead, it may emerge that 
flexible  staffing  contracts  are  associated  with  lower  job  satisfaction.    Beyond 
informing the theory, would be of interest in its own right as consistently lower job 
satisfaction is associated with the intention to leave a worker's current employment 
situation (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2006 and Clark 2001). 
 
As is often the case, researchers in management have explored this issue but have not 
used  either  representative  surveys  of  the  workforce  or  the  established  set  of  job 
satisfaction determinants common in work by economists.  Moreover, the conclusions 
from this work are mixed with flexible staffing arrangements associated with greater 
satisfaction  in  some  studies  and  reduced  satisfaction  in  others  (Connelly  and 
Gallagher 2004).  What does emerge, and what fits with our emphasis on the role 
played  by  active  competition,  is  the  importance  of  worker  volition.  Simply  put, 
workers express greater job satisfaction when they view their contingent work as a 
choice rather than resulting from a lack of alternatives (Krausz et al 1995; Ellingson et   8 
al 1998). Thus, we hope to meet the standard suggested by Hamermesh (2004) by 
using  representative  job  satisfaction  data  to  test  the  general  prediction  that  labor 
markets are sufficiently competitive and generate sufficient worker choices that the 
net employee benefits associated with flexible staffing arrangements are similar to 
those with more traditional contracts.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  is  drawn  from  the  British  Household  Panel  Survey 
(BHPS). The BHPS is a nationally representative sample that each year interviews 
approximately 10,000 individuals from roughly 5,500 households. We use the waves 
of the BHPS corresponding to 1999-2004, as earlier waves do not contain detailed 
information on types of flexible employment contracts.
5 Within these waves, workers 
identify  if  they  worked  as  a  seasonal  worker,  on  a  fixed  term  contract,  casual 
employee, as agency temporary worker or another type of non-permanent. In addition, 
we also identify part-time contracts as another form of flexible working arrangement.
6 
Table  A1  presents  summary  statistics  for  males  and  females  separately.  Briefly, 
women  are  more  likely  to  be  employed  under  flexible  working  arrangements, 
although the gender differences for some contract types, such as agency based work, 
are not large. Women are much more likely to be employed part-time than men. 
 
In Table A2, we provide summary statistics for selected covariates split according to 
contract type. Across a number of dimensions workers on fixed term contracts are 
broadly  comparable  to  permanent  employees.  All  other  flexible  workers  have 
                                                 
5 Prior to 1999, flexible contracts were grouped into seasonal/temporary job and contract/fixed time 
contract. As we will demonstrate later, this type of grouping obscures marked variations within sub-
groups of flexible contracts.  
6 Identified as employees who have usual work hours of less than 32 a week.    9 
markedly lower average weekly wages (particularly casual employees) and are less 
likely to be unionised, work in the public sector, hold a position with a managerial or 
supervisory role or work in a large firm when compared to permanent employees. 
Finally, we report worker separation rates by contract type. It is clear that all forms of 
flexible  employment  contracts  are  associated  with  higher  separation  rates  than 
permanent contracts.  
 
All job satisfaction questions in the BHPS are reported on a 7 value Likert scale, 1 
being  the  least  satisfied,  7  the  most  satisfied.  At  different  times  a  variety  of  job 
satisfaction questions have been included in the BHPS but for the period in which the 
more  detailed  flexible  contract  type  information  is  available,  five  job  satisfaction 
questions are available. These include overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, 
satisfaction with hours worked, satisfaction with job security, and satisfaction with the 
work itself. We further restrict our sample to those individuals aged 20 to 65 and 
exclude the self-employed. This yields an unbalanced panel of 10,001 individuals. 
 
Table 1 presents the mean satisfaction level for overall satisfaction and each of the 
dimensions.    It  does  so  for  workers on  permanent  contracts  and  each  of  the  five 
alternative contracts.  As the averages make clear, the workers on permanent contracts 
do not routinely report the greatest satisfaction.  Indeed, they rank third in overall 
satisfaction, fifth  in  satisfaction with  hours and  fifth  in  satisfaction with the work 
itself.  Workers on permanent contract do rank first in satisfaction with job security 
and their advantage in satisfaction in this dimension is enormous.  
   10 
Following past research, the values of job satisfaction are fitted to the cumulative 
normal distribution through ordered probit estimates (see Clark and Oswald 1996 and 
Clark 1997 among many others).  The ordered probit estimation follows appropriately 
when  the  dependent  variable  has  a  natural  ordering,  such  as  from  least  to  most 
satisfied (see McKelvey and Zavonia 1975 for details) and can be used to predict the 
probability of reporting each value for job satisfaction for variation in the values of 
the independent variables. 
 
4. INITIAL EVIDENCE: ARE FLEXIBLE WORKERS LESS SATISFIED? 
 
This section presents the initial estimations of the relationships between contract type 
and  job  satisfaction.  Throughout  the  paper  estimates  are  presented  separately  for 
males and females.  Separating the estimates follows from both the routine finding of 
separate job satisfaction regimes for men and women (Clark 1997) and from tests 
within our own sample rejecting the hypothesis of a common set of coefficients. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 2 presents pooled ordered probit estimates of the impact of flexible employment 
contracts on job satisfaction split by gender. Standard controls for personal and work 
characteristics are included and reported. Agency and casual work are associated with 
lower job satisfaction for both men and women, as are fixed term contracts although 
this effect is only statistically significant for women. The category of other flexible 
working contracts is associated with a marginally significantly lower job satisfaction 
for women. There is no indication of a statistically significant relationship between   11 
seasonal work and job satisfaction, whilst part-time work actually appears to increases 
job satisfaction for men. Other personal and workplace characteristics conform to the 
signs  and  significance  reported  in  numerous  other  studies  that  estimate  job 
satisfaction models using the BHPS (see for instance Clark and Oswald, 1996; Green 
and Heywood, 2007). 
 
The estimates in Table 2 hold constant earnings that according to theory may vary to 
compensate  for  undesirable  contract  characteristics.    Thus,  we  re-estimated  the 
specifications  omitting  wages  as  a  control.  Yet,  allowing  earnings  to  vary,  the 
estimates of flexible employment contracts on job satisfaction remain unchanged in 
terms  of  sign  and  significance.  This  suggests  that  workers  on  casual  and  agency 
contracts do not receive sufficient financial compensation to offset the undesirable 
characteristics of these employment contracts.  
 
The estimates in Table 2 may still not be reliable if that they rest upon unrealistic 
comparisons.  Flexible  employment  contracts  are  much  less  common  in  certain 
employment settings, such as the public sector or unionised workplaces. Furthermore, 
when they are used in such settings, the lower levels of job security may be mitigated 
by  the  higher  overall  levels  of  job  security  associated  with  these  forms  of 
employment. Thus, estimating the true effects of flexible employment contracts on 
job satisfaction may require more standardization of the workplaces being examined.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3. 
   12 
To investigate this we re-estimate the models in Table 2 excluding workers in the 
public sector and those who are union members. These are reported in the first panel 
of Table 3.  The key change is that females in non-unionised, private sector work are 
significantly  less  satisfied  with  fixed  term  contract  work,  an  effect  that  was  not 
apparent  in the  full  sample. This effect  is of a  similar  magnitude to the effect of 
agency work on job satisfaction for females. There are, however, no marked changes 
for males. We further limit the estimations to only those workers in lower skilled 
occupations as they may be a more homogenous group of workers facing more similar 
choices between contract types. As reported in panel 2 of table 3, this restriction does 
not materially affect the pattern of sign and significance of flexible working contracts 
on  male  job  satisfaction.  The  negative  impacts  of  agency  and  casual  work  are, 
however, no longer statistically significant for women.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Another issue is that flexible working contracts are likely to be associated with other 
workplace  and  contract  characteristics.  For  instance,  they  may  involve  a  higher 
likelihood  of  non-standard  working  hours,  and  may  differ  in  access  to  other 
alternative working arrangements such as flexitime. We include a range of additional 
controls for different working conditions into the base models reported in Table 2. 
These  controls  include,  whether  the  individual  receives  annual  incremental  wage 
increases, whether there are promotion opportunities in the current job, and whether 
they work non-standard hours (shift work, night work and other non-standard hours). 
We also include controls for a variety of alternative working arrangements such as the 
provision of flexitime, annualised hours, term time working and job sharing. All of   13 
these working conditions are likely to be correlated with flexible working contracts, 
and may affect job satisfaction. These estimates are provided in Table 4.  While a 
number of these controls have markedly significant effects on worker job satisfaction, 
there  inclusion  does  not  change  the  pattern  of  sign  and  significance  of  flexible 
working contracts on job satisfaction.  
 
Critically,  workers  are  likely  to  sort  into  working  arrangements  in  a  non-random 
manner.  Hence,  the  relationship  observed  between  job  satisfaction  and  flexible 
working arrangements may be biased by unobservable characteristics that influence 
both  the  propensity  to  be  in  flexible  working  contracts  and  the  level  of  job 
satisfaction.  At  an  extreme,  inherently  unsatisfied  workers  may  sort  into  flexible 
contracts  rather  than  permanent  contracts  lowering  the  apparent  job  satisfaction. 
Alternatively, unmeasured worker characteristics such as lower initiative or ability 
may  be  correlated  both  with  lower  job  satisfaction  and  with  working  in  flexible 
contracts. We investigate these possibilities by re-estimating individual fixed effects 
ordered probit versions of the models reported in Table 4.
7  
 
INSERT TABLE 5. 
 
These  estimates  are  reported  in  Table  5  and  depend  only  on  the  variance  within 
worker across  years.  In other words, they  follow from observing a given worker 
changing status into and out of flexible contracts.  For males, these estimates suggest 
that  the  negative  effects  of  agency  and  casual  work  contracts  on  job  satisfaction 
reported in Table 4 are robust to worker sorting between contract types.  For females, 
                                                 
7 These estimations were performed in Limdep 8.0 and the full results are available from the authors 
upon request.   14 
worker sorting appears to play a more marked role. While casual work and "other" 
flexible contracts continue to be significantly associated with lower job satisfaction, 
agency work is no longer associated with significantly lower levels of job satisfaction, 
and the negative effect of fixed term contracts just misses statistical significance at the 
10 percent level.  Part-time work is no longer significantly associated with higher job 
satisfaction for males, but there is now evidence of a positive influence of part-time 
work for females. Finally, once individual fixed effects are included seasonal work is 
associated with significantly higher levels of job satisfaction for females, an effect 
that was not apparent in the cross-sectional estimates.  On balance, accounting for 
fixed effects tends to suggest that flexible staffing has more modest and even some 
contradictory  effects  for  women.  This  is  important  given  that  a  large  majority  of 
workers on flexible contracts are women (see Table A2). 
 
The sum of the evidence provided in this section suggests that seasonal work, part 
time  work  and  other  flexible  contracts  do  not  have  a  consistent  influence  on  job 
satisfaction. The coefficients can take either sign and can occasionally emerge as both 
positive and significant.  Fixed term contracts appear to be associated with decreased 
satisfaction for women but not for men.  Agency work and casual work routinely take 
large  negative  coefficients  that  are  usually  statistical  different  from  zero.     These 
patterns emerge when (a) allowing wages to vary; (b) estimating on narrower and 
more  comparable  subsamples;  (d)  accounting  for  variations  in  other  aspects  of 
workplace characteristics and the work contract; and (d) accounting for unobserved 
worker fixed effects. In the next section we  focus on why some  flexible working 
contracts have such a marked negative effect on job satisfaction.  




5. WHY DO FLEXIBLE CONTRACTS REDUCE JOB SATISFACTION? 
 
To examine how flexible working contracts influence job satisfaction we focus on 
four different dimensions of job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with 
hours, satisfaction with job security and satisfaction with work itself. Each can be 
thought of as revealing satisfaction with a different aspect of the job and can be used 
to examine the impact of flexible contracts. The first two, reveal whether flexible 
contracts lead to different (and more or less desirable) pay and hours outcomes. There 
is a critical distinction, in the first case, the impact of flexible contracts on satisfaction 
with pay conditional on actual pay levels and its overall effect not conditioned on pay. 
Similarly there is a distinction between the impact of flexible work on satisfaction 
with  hours worked both conditioned and  not conditioned on actual  hours. In both 
cases,  the  conditional  estimate  reveals  flexible  work  contracts  effect  worker 
satisfaction  with  how  the  pay  level  (number  of  contracted  hours)  is  determined 
holding pay (hours) constant. The unconditional estimate  is a combination of this 
effect along with the overall impact of flexible work on pay and hours. Satisfaction 
with security reveals employee reaction to the lower job security that is likely to be 
associated with flexible contracts. We will estimate the determinants of satisfaction 
with  security  both  with  and  without  a  control  for  earnings  to  again  examine  the 
possibility  of  compensating  differentials.    Finally,  examining  satisfaction  with  the 
work itself provides some indication of any link between flexible working contracts 
and poorer quality jobs.    16 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
INSERT TABLE 6B 
 
Estimates of these models are presented in Table 6 and the unconditional estimates of 
satisfaction with pay, hours and job security are reported in Table 6b.  For males, four 
of the six flexible contracts are associated with greater satisfaction with pay. Fixed 
term contract work and part-time work even take significant positive coefficients. 
These significant effects remain once controls for pay are omitted. For females, five 
of the six flexible contracts take positive coefficients with fixed term contracts and 
"other"  flexible  contracts  being  significant.      While  the  unconditional  estimates 
generate more negative coefficients, there are no significant negative coefficients for 
either males or females in either the conditional or unconditional estimates.  In short, 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  diminished  overall  job  satisfaction  associated  with 
flexible contracts (especially casual and agency contracts) results because of lower 
satisfaction with pay. 
 
Satisfaction with hours presents a somewhat more mixed pattern.   Men seem less 
satisfied with the hours associated with agency work but the satisfaction of women 
does not seem influenced by agency work.  Casual work diminishes the satisfaction 
with hours for women but not for men.  Men report greater satisfaction with the hours 
associated with "other" flexible contracts. The reaction to part time work seems to 
vary  by  gender.    In  the  unconditional  estimates  both  genders  express  greater 
satisfaction with hours when working part time. Even given the mixed pattern, we   17 
conclude there is no compelling evidence that dissatisfaction with hours pay drives 
the lower overall job satisfaction. 
 
While there is evidence in Table 6 that agency work may be associated with reduced 
satisfaction  with  the  work  itself,  it  stands  alone  in  this  regard.  By  far  the  most 
dramatic  evidence  emerges  in  the  estimated  satisfaction  with  job  security.  Every 
flexible  contract  type  except  part  time  employment  is  associated  with  large  and 
statistically significant reductions in the satisfaction with job security.  This is true for 
both women and for men.  This emerges as the strongest and most consistent result 
from examining the facets of job satisfaction. This does not appear to be affected in 
sign and significance by removing a control for wages (Table 6b). Furthermore, it is 
evidence that is largely repeated in the fixed effect estimates, as shown in Table 7, 
and so is unlikely to emerge from sorting.  These estimates suggest that virtually all 
types of flexible contracts are associated with lower satisfaction with job security. 
Moreover,  it appears that it  is the dissatisfaction with  job  security that drives the 
overall dissatisfaction associated with casual and agency contracts.    
 
Table  7  does  suggest  that  some  of  the  cross  section  results  do  not  persist.    The 
negative effects of flexible working contracts on satisfaction with job security remain 
as stressed but the negative effect of agency work on satisfaction with work itself is 
no longer apparent. This, combined with a lack of statistically significant negative 
effects for other contract types on satisfaction with work itself, leads us to conclude 
that  there  is  no  evidence  that  flexible  working  contracts  are  associated  with 
intrinsically lower quality jobs again pointing us back to the role of job security.  The 
positive effect on pay satisfaction of part-time work (for males) and other flexible   18 
contracts (for females) reported in table 6 are not robust to the inclusion of individual 
level fixed effects.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
We  have  emphasized  a  substantial  role  for  job  security  as  a  determinant  of  the 
negative effect of flexible employment contracts on overall job security revealed in 
Section 4. The strength of this finding causes one to wonder if any forms of flexible 
contracts would be associated with lower job satisfaction if job security were held 
constant. Put differently, it could be the case that differences in job security between 
permanent  and  flexible  contracts  fully  explain  the  lower  satisfaction  reported  in 
agency and casual contracts. To explore this we re-estimate the models of overall job 
satisfaction reported originally in Table 5, controlling for the individual's satisfaction 
with job security.  Results from this exercise are reported in Table 8.   
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
All of the coefficients on the different types of flexible contracts are positive for both 
genders. The results strongly suggest that conditional on satisfaction with job security, 
males are more satisfied with most types of flexible work and indifferent to casual 
contracts. For females seasonal and casual work have no statistically significant effect 
on job satisfaction.  As a consequence, we have greater belief in our conclusion that it 
is dissatisfaction with job security that drives the overall result that workers dislike 
some types of flexible staffing arrangements such as agency and casual contracts.  
   19 
Thus,  if  one  holds  constant  satisfaction  with  the  job  security,  most  of  the  other 
flexible contracts (seasonal, fixed, other) look desirable. Overall satisfaction in these 
contracts is greater.  When combined with the tenor of the earlier cross-sectional and 
fixed effect estimates, this provides partial support for the hypothesis from Section 2.  
The  lack  of  job  security  lowers  overall  satisfaction  but  is  offset  by  other 
characteristics such that there was little or no difference in on-the-job utility between 
permanent contracts and these flexible contracts.  This suggestion is repeated when 
holding  satisfaction  with  job  security  constant  makes  these  types  of  contracts 
desirable. 
 
While this provides an initial indication that the critical issue is job security between 
flexible and non-flexible employment contracts, it may over control. If all types of 
satisfaction are simply highly correlated we may have controlled away the relevant 
variance.  To check this we successively use the other dimension of satisfaction in the 
place of satisfaction with job security.  The results from this are presented in appendix 
table A3.  It is noticeable that the inclusion of controls for other dimensions of job 
satisfaction does not alter the point estimates of the negative impact of agency or 
casual  work  on  overall  job  satisfaction.  This  provides  further  support  that 
dissatisfaction with job security drives the reduction in overall satisfaction associated 
with these two types of contracts.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
We began with a suggestion that if most workers have a choice between permanent 
and flexible contracts, wage differentials will develop to create roughly similar on-
the-job utility between the two types of contracts.  We tested this hypothesis using   20 
data from the BHPS and found rather mixed results.  First, some types of flexible 
contracts do seem to be associated with similar levels of job satisfaction.  We could 
not confirm a routine and sizeable difference between permanent contracts and those 
that are seasonal, of fixed duration or are part time.  Thus, on balance, it would appear 
that examining these types of contracts supports the suggestion.  On the other hand, 
we  found  routine  and  large  reductions  in  job  satisfaction  associated  with  agency 
contracts and casual contracts. The reductions associated with these types of contracts 
persisted across attempts to refine our comparison sample, vary our specification and 
control for worker fixed effects.    
 
By examining different facets of satisfaction, it was revealed that all types of flexible 
contracts  were  associated  with  reduced  satisfaction  with  job  security.  This  was 
perhaps not surprising given the markedly higher separation rates, when compared to 
permanent contracts, associated with all types of flexible contracts. Controlling for the 
lower level of satisfaction with job security caused the overall satisfaction results to 
change dramatically.  Those types of contracts that previously  had  little effect on 
overall  satisfaction  (fixed,  seasonal  and  part time)  all  emerged  as  associated  with 
greater  job  satisfaction.    This  supports the  notion  that  although  flexible  contracts 
provide less satisfaction with job security, other aspects of the job compensate so that 
overall satisfaction appears similar. Those types of contract that previously reduced 
overall satisfaction (agency and casual) emerged with mixed and even insignificant 
coefficients once controlling for satisfaction with security. These results suggest that, 
in essence, the lower overall job satisfaction associated with agency and casual work 
is  due  to  employees  on  these  contracts  experiencing  lower  satisfaction  with  job 
security that is not offset by other job characteristics.    21 
 
The persistence of lower satisfaction for these two types of contracts could suggest 
that the basic building block of the notion of compensating differences may not apply.  
The majority of workers accepting agency and casual work may not have choices of 
permanent contracts.  They may be crowded into these types of flexible contracts.  A 
remaining intriguing puzzle for future research is why this appears to be the case for 
some types of flexible contracts but clearly not others.   22 
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TABLE 1– Job Satisfaction and Temporary Contracts Type, 1999 BHPS. 
  Overall  Pay  hours  work  security 
Permanent (6610)  5.304  4.863  5.158  5.420  5.455 
Seasonal Work (17)  5.765  4.941  5.765  5.824  4.647 
Fixed Term Contract (187)  5.198  4.769  5.226  5.489  3.385 
Agency Temp (66)  4.537  4.545  5.194  4.716  3.045 
Casual Employee (37)  5.027  4.568  5.054  5.676  3.595 
Other Flexible Contract (53)  5.453  4.596  5.698  5.698  3.538 
Observations  6970           28 
TABLE  2–  Job  Satisfaction  and  Flexible  Working  Arrangements,  Ordered  Probit 
Estimates Males versus Females, 1999-2004 BHPS. 
  Male  Female 
  Coeff  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err 
Seasonal Work  0.085  0.355  -0.150  0.192 
Fixed Term Contract  -0.055  0.066  -0.151*  0.052 
Agency Work  -0.409*  0.095  -0.343*  0.091 
Casual Contract  -0.448*  0.172  -0.339*  0.116 
Other Flexible Contract  -0.110  0.113  -0.175***  0.101 
Part Time  0.243*  0.070  0.061  0.041 
Bonus/Profit Share  0.077*  0.023  0.052**  0.026 
Performance Pay  0.077**  0.035  -0.051  0.037 
Bonus/Profit Share & 
Performance Pay 
0.043  0.033  -0.010  0.040 
Age  -0.037*  0.008  -0.019*  0.007 
Age
2  0.0001*  0.000  0.0001*  0.000 
Tenure  -0.001***  0.001  -0.002*  0.001 
Married  0.037  0.027  0.133*  0.024 
A Level  -0.147*  0.030  -0.100*  0.029 
Diploma  -0.118*  0.042  -0.171*  0.043 
Degree  -0.170*  0.039  -0.189*  0.036 
Higher Degree  -0.140**  0.056  -0.289*  0.062 
Log Wage  0.064*  0.014  0.018  0.015 
Usual Hours  0.000  0.002  -0.007*  0.002 
Usual Overtime  0.004*  0.001  -0.003  0.002 
Union Member  -0.131*  0.028  -0.139*  0.026 
Public Sector  0.118*  0.036  0.114*  0.031 
Manager/Supervisor  0.044***  0.025  0.021  0.024 
Pension  0.033  0.027  -0.011  0.026 
Employer Training  0.066*  0.022  0.104*  0.021 
Firm Size         
50-99 employees  -0.096*  0.028  -0.077*  0.025 
100-499 employees  -0.148*  0.029  -0.127*  0.029 
500 employees  -0.127*  0.033  -0.147*  0.030 
Log Likelihood  -28403.332    -27719.711   
Observations  19048    19782   
Controls included but not reported; industry, occupation, region and year dummies. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. *,**, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   29 
 
TABLE 3 Job Satisfaction, Flexible Work and Non-Union, Non-Managerial, Private 
Sector Jobs, 1999-2004 
 
All controls as in table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
*,**,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  1%,  5%  and  10%  level,  respectively.
  (I) Private Sector, Non-Union, Non-Managerial Workers 
  MALES  FEMALES 
  Coeff  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err 
Seasonal Work  -0.181  0.418  -0.277  0.234 
Fixed Term Contract  0.081  0.102  -0.349*  0.099 
Agency Work  -0.416*  0.116  -0.337*  0.107 
Casual Contract  -0.402**  0.190  -0.564*  0.154 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-0.131  0.175  -0.270  0.175 
Part Time  0.209  0.101  0.098  0.073 
Log Likelihood  -9870.2041  -8824.2735 
Observations  6434  5999 
  (II) I + Low Skill Workers Only 
  MALES  FEMALES 
  Coeff  Std.Err  Coeff  Std.Err 
Seasonal Work  -0.395  0.487  -0.369  0.274 
Fixed Term Contract  0.073  0.189  -0.461**  0.215 
Agency Work  -0.507*  0.155  -0.250  0.296 
Casual Contract  -0.632*  0.225  -0.411  0.277 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-0.108  0.317  0.076  0.283 
Part Time  0.143  0.139  0.077  0.120 
Log Likelihood  -3450.0632    -2641.0393   
Observations  2214    1763     30 
Table 4- The Role of Job Conditions on Flexible Work and Job Satisfaction 
 
  Males  Females 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
Seasonal Work  0.133  0.354  -0.131  0.194 
Fixed Term Contract  -0.049  0.066  -0.143*  0.053 
Agency Work  -0.365*  0.095  -0.314*  0.091 
Casual Contract  -0.411**  0.178  -0.319*  0.116 
Other Flexible Contract  -0.088  0.115  -0.168***  0.101 
Part Time  0.245*  0.061  0.021  0.038 
Annual Increment  0.174*  0.021  0.144*  0.020 
Night Shift  -0.124  0.079  -0.066  0.078 
Shift Work  -0.069**  0.033  0.043  0.039 
Other Non Standard Hours  -0.049  0.035  -0.064***  0.034 
Flexitime  0.062**  0.028  0.004  0.025 
Annualised Hours  -0.089***  0.048  -0.055  0.051 
Term Time Work Only  0.102  0.151  0.078  0.056 
Job Sharing  -0.229  0.254  -0.183**  0.094 
Log Likelihood  -28335.820    -27682.061   
Observations  19048    19782   
All other controls as  in table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the  individual 
level.  *,**,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  1%,  5%  and  10%  level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5- Fixed Effects Ordered Probit Estimates, Employees Aged 20-65 
  Male  Female 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
Seasonal Work  0.055  0.396  0.699*  0.330 
Fixed Term Contract  0.017  0.098  -0.132  0.081 
Agency Work  -0.352*  0.141  -0.169  0.139 
Casual Contract  -0.794*  0.235  -0.481*  0.192 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
0.078  0.162  -0.306**  0.134 
Part Time  0.041  0.084  0.115**  0.058 
Log Likelihood  -19800.230        -18980.100       
Observations  19,007    19,761   
All controls as in table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
*,**, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively   32 
TABLE 6 Dimensions of Job Satisfaction and Temporary Contract Type, Ordered 
Probit Estimates, Employees Aged 20-65, 1999-2004 
  PAY  HOURS 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err
Seasonal Work  0.067  0.427  0.153  0.242  -0.142  0.311  -0.126  0.183
Fixed Term Contract  0.205*  0.068  0.191*  0.057  0.051  0.063  0.030  0.058
Agency Work  0.022  0.107  0.043  0.094  -0.200***  0.108  0.008  0.093
Casual Contract  0.073  0.205  -0.069  0.118  -0.207  0.186  -0.377*  0.139
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-0.017  0.119  0.204**  0.096  0.184***  0.113  -0.048  0.103
Part Time  0.356*  0.061  0.026  0.039  -0.249*  0.065  0.115*  0.039
Log Likelihood  -30774.795   -31719.738  -30292.578     -29732.688 
Observations  19045  19780  19045  19780 
  JOB SECURITY  WORK ITSELF 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err
Seasonal Work  -1.271*  0.330  -0.615*  0.220  0.467  0.311  -0.234  0.210
Fixed Term Contract  -1.114*  0.071  -1.332*  0.060  0.028  0.065  0.079  0.057
Agency Work  -1.323*  0.096  -1.262*  0.093  -0.234**  0.108  -0.241*  0.094
Casual Contract  -0.789*  0.194  -1.051*  0.128  -0.188  0.175  -0.065  0.121
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-1.129*  0.135  -1.313*  0.116  0.066  0.112  0.049  0.093
Part Time  0.228*  0.059  0.055  0.040  0.210*  0.062  0.009  0.034
Log Likelihood  -29883.658    -29082.781    -28625.444      -28705.53 
Observations  19045    19780    19045    19780 
All controls as in table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
*,**, *** indicate statistical  
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 6B Satisfaction with Pay and Hours, Unconditional Estimates Ordered Probit 





































All controls as in table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level. 
*,**, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  Pay (w/o wages) 
  Male  Female 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
Seasonal Work  -0.045  0.413  0.080  0.245 
Fixed Term 
Contract 
0.199*  0.068  0.184*  0.057 
Agency Work  -0.108  0.107  -0.049  0.093 
Casual Contract  -0.066  0.202  -0.128  0.116 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-0.070  0.121  0.204**  0.095 
Part Time  0.302*  0.061  -0.035  0.039 
Log Likelihood  -30937.098    -31771.385   
Observations  19045    19780   
  Hours (w/o hours) 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
Seasonal Work  -0.220  0.314  -0.097  0.181 
Fixed Term 
Contract 
0.042  0.062  0.084  0.057 
Agency Work  -0.183***  0.109  -0.037  0.094 
Casual Contract  -0.105  0.184  -0.314**  0.137 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
0.245**  0.117  0.032  0.105 
Part Time  0.219*  0.054  0.420*  0.026 
Log Likelihood  -30749.882    -30216.24     
Observations  19045    19780   
         
  Job Security (w/o wages) 
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
Seasonal Work  -1.330*  0.326  -0.670*  0.219 
Fixed Term 
Contract 
-1.138*  0.071  -1.345*  0.060 
Agency Work  -1.378*  0.095  -1.307*  0.092 
Casual Contract  -0.848*  0.093  -1.094*  0.128 
Other Flexible 
Contract 
-1.320*  0.135  -1.322*  0.117 
Part Time  0.216*  0.059  0.056  0.040 
Log Likelihood  -29984.958    -29129.039   
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Variable   Male   Female 
Seasonal Work         0.001   0.002 
Fixed Term Contract         0.019   0.027 
Agency Work         0.007   0.009 
Casual Contract         0.004   0.008 
Other Flexible Contract  0.005  0.008 
Part Time  0.046  0.418 
Age (yrs)        39.196   39.443 
Tenure (yrs)        10.200   10.382 
Married         0.596   0.577 
Dependant Child         0.005   0.317 
A Level         0.220   0.191 
Diploma         0.092   0.076 
Degree         0.134   0.142 
Higher Degree         0.042   0.032 
Log Pay         6.667   6.371 
Normal Hours        39.646   30.173 
Overtime Hours         3.990   2.164 
Union Member         0.285   0.321 
Public Sector         0.232   0.450 
Manager/Supervisor         0.415   0.320 
Pension         0.527   0.501 
Employer Training         0.174   0.184 
Firm Size     
50-99         0.256   0.269 
100-499         0.249   0.186 
500+         0.175   0.158 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   38 
TABLE  A3  –  Overall  Job  Satisfaction  Controlling  for  Other  Dimensions  of  Job 
Satisfaction 
 
All other controls as per table 4. *,**, *** indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Controlling for Pay Satisfaction 
  Male    Female   
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
seasonal  0.231  0.211  -0.175  0.165 
ftc  -0.111  0.069  -0.221*  0.055 
agency  -0.408*  0.092  -0.391*  0.093 
casual  -0.458*  0.163  -0.326*  0.118 
part_time  0.128**  0.057  -0.003  0.037 
other_flex  -0.066  0.125  -0.276*  0.101 
         
  Controlling for Hours Satisfaction 
  Male    Female   
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
seasonal  0.246  0.259  -0.086  0.188 
ftc  -0.052  0.071  -0.156*  0.055 
agency  -0.282*  0.103  -0.389*  0.094 
casual  -0.363***  0.192  -0.177  0.123 
part_time  0.519*  0.063  -0.019  0.038 
other_flex  -0.198  0.120  -0.149  0.105 
         
  Controlling for Satisfaction with Work Itself 
  Male    Female   
  Coeff  Std Err  Coeff  Std Err 
seasonal  -0.138  0.351  0.085  0.173 
ftc  -0.059  0.064  -0.234*  0.054 
agency  -0.208**  0.098  -0.229*  0.085 
casual  -0.442**  0.189  -0.377*  0.118 
part_time  0.213*  0.056  -0.004  0.035 
other_flex  -0.179  0.122  -0.267*  0.103 